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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the science fiction comic series Tokyo Ghost, humanity is addicted 
to the vapid release of virtual technology.1 The dystopian Isles of New Los 
Angeles, year 2089, are brimming with apathetic consumers who are ad-
dicted to artificial diversion.2 Saturated with nanotech, the dependent popu-
lation is subservient to an entertainment industry run by digitally augmented 
thugs.3 Constable character Led Dent is so engrossed with the shows and ads 
that constantly stream on his ever-present holographic screens, that he is 
largely oblivious to the presence of his tech-free girlfriend Debbie Decay.4 
A panel in Issue #1 depicts the onslaught of colorful ads that obstructs Dent’s 
field of view as he drives his monstrous bike through the polluted city 
streets.5 
Whatever your views on the growing presence of technology in mod-
ern-day society, Tokyo Ghost demonstrates how an immersive digital land-
scape presents the unique potential for companies to engage with consumers. 
Advertisers are already using virtual reality and augmented reality to appeal 
to consumers in creative ways. For instance, Patrón offers a virtual reality 
tour of Hacienda Patrón on YouTube.6 Users explore Weber Blue Agave 
fields as Patrón’s iconic bee, fly through a keyhole at Hacienda Patrón, and 
observe as the agave is roasted, crushed, fermented, and distilled.7 And lux-
ury online retailer Net-A-Porter developed an augmented reality app that in-
teracts with window displays to showcase the Karl by Karl Lagerfeld collec-
tion.8 The app reveals catwalk video clips and product information when 
fashionistas scan images of storefront products.9  
Science fiction has long envisioned the advent of virtual and augmented 
reality through technological maturity. Although still in its infancy, such 
technology is no longer a futuristic fiction. Moreover, augmented reality will 
become a particularly powerful tool for companies because it provides the 
most engaging brand experience. By blurring the distinction between 
 
 1.  See RICK REMENDER, The Atomic Garden, in TOKYO GHOST 1 (Sebastian Girner ed. 2016). 
 2.  See id. 
 3.  See id. 
 4.  See id. 
 5.  Id. 
 6.  See Virtual Hacienda Tour, TEQUILA PATRÓN, https://www.patrontequila.com/global-en/our-
story/oculus.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 7.  See id. 
 8.  Victoria Thompson, Net-a-Porter Uses Augmented Reality to Launch Karl Lagerfeld Collec-
tion, RETAILWEEK (Feb. 9, 2012), https://www.retail-week.com/net-a-porter-uses-augmented-reality-to-
launch-karl-lagerfeld-collection/5033455.blog. 
 9.  Id. 
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tangible actuality and artificial stimuli, augmented reality allows businesses 
to create compelling advertising campaigns. Imagine an augmented reality 
app for Major League Baseball that utilizes eyewear and headphones. Upon 
initiating the app, you can transform your backyard into a baseball field. You 
are not simply passively watching a sports ad, impatiently waiting for the 
two-dimensional images to pass. You are an active participant. You swing 
your arms, feel the thud of the digital ball, and hear the crowd roaring.10 As 
you bask in the experience, you see the MLB logo plastered on digital bill-
boards, on the jumbotron, and on the blimp above. The brand is the winning 
team and it is hitting a home-run.  
This note will discuss the intersection of augmented reality and trade-
mark dilution. Part I provides a brief overview of virtual reality and aug-
mented reality technology. Part II examines dilution under the Trademark 
Dilution Revision Act (TDRA). Part III applies dilution theory to the aug-
mented reality platform, and Part IV considers potential defenses to aug-
mented reality dilution. 
II. VIRTUAL REALITY AND AUGMENTED REALITY 
TECHNOLOGY 
Fascination with the unreal real is nothing new. Before the introduction 
of photography, motion picture, and digital imaging, paintings relied on per-
spective to mimic real life. Trompe l’oeil is an illusionist art technique that 
deceives the viewer into believing that representation is reality.11 An anec-
dote from Pliny the Elder relates the ancient Greek rivalry of Parrhasius and 
Zeuxis.12 Zeuxis painted a picture of a bunch of grapes that was so realistic 
that birds flew down to peck at the fruit.13 Proud of this accomplishment, 
Zeuxis requested that the curtain covering his painting be drawn.14 But the 
curtain was in fact a painting by Parrhasius, making Parrhasius the victor.15 
Humbled, Zeuxis admitted that although he had deceived the birds, 
Parrhasius had deceived him as an artist.16  
 
 10.  Cf. MATJAŽ MIHELJ ET AL., Virtual Reality Technology and Applications, in 68 INTELLIGENT 
SYSTEMS, CONTROL AND AUTOMATION: SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING 201 (2014) (“In principle, aug-
mented reality can stimulate all five senses . . . .”). 
 11.  See JOHN A. PARKS, UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF ART: 100 KEY CONCEPTS FOR 
UNDERSTANDING, ANALYZING, AND PRACTICING ART 200 (2015). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  See id. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  See id. 
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Arguably, Parrhasius’ painting produced a more complete illusion of 
reality than virtual and augmented reality technology. Whereas a user is ul-
timately still aware of the underlying computer interface, Parrhasius 
achieved belief without suspension. Nonetheless, virtual reality takes artifice 
a step further. Virtual technology would allow the sensation of lifting the 
curtain, but the illusion of Parrhasius’ painting was lost the moment finger 
touched canvas. Although the intent of imitative art and virtual technology 
is mimesis, the former relies on artistic skill, while the latter utilizes com-
puter science. 
Virtual reality refers to an interactive computer system that detects user 
movement to provide simulated presence and interaction in an artificial en-
vironment.17 Immersion relies on a feedback loop.18 The user provides the 
computer interface with input in the form of motion or physiological sig-
nals.19 And the computer uses that information to produce a display that the 
user can interact with in real time.20 Thus, virtual reality is comprised of four 
elements: the virtual environment, spatial presence, sensory feedback, and 
interactivity.21  
The virtual environment displays synthetic objects that the user can ob-
serve and manipulate.22 Navigation in the virtual space adheres to human 
expectations of depth and distance. Cognitive processing of user position in 
relation to objects creates physical presence.23 Physical presence refers to the 
sensation of existence that is rendered through visual, aural, and haptic mo-
dalities.24 Mental presence occurs on a spectrum.25 On one end is conscious 
recognition of artificiality and on the other end is transitory loss of medium 
awareness.26 User degree of mental engagement is affected by the delay be-
tween user action and computer response, graphics quality, and sensory stim-
ulation.27 Sensory feedback and interactivity support verisimilitude.28 Sen-
sory feedback refers to data output based on computer tracking of user 
orientation and location.29 Interactivity includes the user’s ability to affect 
 
 17.  See MIHELJ ET AL., supra note 10, at 1. 
 18.  See id. at 10. 
 19.  See id. at 11. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  Id. at 1. 
 22.  See id. at 3. 
 23.  See id. 
 24.  See id. 
 25.  See id. 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  Id. 
 28.  See id. at 4. 
 29.  See id. 
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the virtual environment and the user’s ability to change his or her vantage 
point.30  
Augmented reality is a type of virtual reality in which display technol-
ogy is superimposed onto the real world.31 Overlays augment the information 
available for user consumption.32 Unlike virtual reality, augmented reality 
enhances, rather than replaces, the real world.33 For example, Vito Technol-
ogy’s Star Walk app allows amateur stargazers to point their smartphones at 
the night sky to identify celestial bodies.34 And the Google Translate app can 
change foreign text into native language when users hover their mobile cam-
eras over the text.35  
Augmented reality consists of two phases: (1) sensing environmental 
information and (2) environment reconstruction.36 Information from the real 
world is collected using sensing technology, such as GPS and digital cam-
eras, to create a three-dimensional model.37 The integrated environment is 
created using equations that calculate interactions between real and virtual 
objects.38 The ideal system synchronizes information from the real world and 
information from the virtual world seamlessly.39 Thus, augmented reality 
must regularly refresh virtual objects to allow real time interaction and re-
sponsivity.40  
III. TRADEMARK DILUTION 
Frank Schechter is credited with introducing trademark dilution theory 
in a 1927 Harvard Law Review article.41 Schechter argued that trademarks 
convey quality and a trademark’s value derives from its selling power.42 
Since this selling power is amplified by a mark’s uniqueness, owners of ar-
bitrary or fanciful marks, such as ROLLS-ROYCE and AUNT JEMIMA’S, 
 
 30.  See id. 
 31.  Id. at 9. 
 32.  See id. at 195. 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  See Star Walk: Star Gazing Guide, VITO TECHNOLOGY, http://vitotechnology.com/star-
walk.html (last visited Apr. 4, 2017). 
 35.  Lauren Covello, Google Just Made It Possible for You to Instantly Read Japanese, FORTUNE 
(Jan. 26, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/01/26/google-translate-japanese. 
 36.  MIHELJ ET AL., supra note 10, at 196. 
 37.  See id. at 196, 198. 
 38.  See id. at 198. 
 39.  See id. at 196. 
 40.  See id. 
 41.  See generally Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813 (1927). 
 42.  See id. at 831. 
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should be protected from unauthorized use that diminishes association with 
the product.43 According to Schechter, dilution refers to “the gradual whit-
tling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon the public mind of the 
mark or name.”44 While traditional trademark infringement law protects the 
consumer from confusion, dilution law protects the mark’s holder and the 
mark’s commercial value.45 And unlike trademark infringement, dilution 
does not require consumer confusion in the marketplace or competition.46 
Because even if a consumer is not confused by the junior use, the presence 
of the senior user’s mark on goods or services from two different sources 
will weaken the mark’s ability to identify and distinguish the senior user.47  
State dilution law and federal dilution law coexist.48 Until the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA) became effective in 1996, mark holders 
relied on state statutes for protection from dilution.49 Under the FTDA, the 
owner of a famous mark was entitled to injunctive relief against a junior 
user’s commercial use of a mark if such use started after the mark became 
famous and diluted the mark’s distinctive quality.50 The FTDA was intended 
to promote predictable and uniform protection of famous marks.51 Neverthe-
less, subsequent circuit splits on the following three issues demonstrated the 
statute’s ambiguities: (1) whether the FTDA required actual dilution or 
merely a likelihood of dilution; (2) whether the FTDA protected only inher-
ently distinctive marks, and not marks that had acquired distinctiveness; and 
(3) whether the FTDA protected marks with niche fame.52  
Confusion concerning the statute’s phrase “causes dilution” culminated 
in the Supreme Court’s 2003 decision Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc.53 
In the dilution action between lingerie retailer Victoria’s Secret and adult 
novelty vendor Victor’s Little Secret, the Court held that violation of the 
FTDA required the owner of a famous mark to prove actual dilution.54 
 
 43.  See id. at 829. 
 44.  Id. at 825. 
 45.  Kathleen Goodberlet, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Prospective Changes to 
Dilution Definition, Claim Analyses, and Standard of Harm, 6 J. HIGH TECH. L. 249, 252 (2006). 
 46.  See id. at 253–54. 
 47.  See Hershey Foods Corp. v. Mars, Inc., 998 F. Supp. 500, 503 (M.D. Pa. 1998). 
 48.  See J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 
24:93 (4th ed. 2017). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, 109 Stat. 985 (formerly codified 
at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)). 
 51.  H.R. Rep. No. 104–374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1030. 
 52.  Marc L. Delflache et al., Life After Moseley: The Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 16 TEX. 
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 125, 129–30 (2007). 
 53.  537 U.S. 418 (2003). 
 54.  Id. at 423, 433. 
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Although the Court indicated that circumstantial evidence may be sufficient 
to prove actual dilution, it failed to further explain the mark holder’s burden 
of proof.55 Shortly thereafter, the International Trademark Association 
(INTA) appointed a special committee to recommend amendments to the 
statute.56 And in 2006, Congress enacted the Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act (TDRA).57 The TDRA made various revisions to the FTDA, including 
the following: (1) a dilution claim only requires a likelihood of dilution, ra-
ther than actual dilution; (2) dilution by tarnishment is explicitly recognized 
and defined; (3) dilution by blurring is redefined and six nonexclusive factors 
for court consideration are included; (4) niche fame is excluded; and (5) fa-
mous marks that are distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctive-
ness, are protected.58 Under the TDRA: 
  
[T]he owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently 
or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an 
injunction against another person who, at any time after the 
owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a 
mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilu-
tion by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous 
mark, regardless of the presence of absence of actual or 
likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic in-
jury.59 
 
Therefore, a federal dilution claim requires ownership of a famous mark 
that is distinctive and third-party use of the mark in commerce that is likely 
to cause dilution.60 
A. Fame Requirement 
The TDRA provides, “a mark is famous if it is widely recognized by 
the general consuming public of the United States as a designation of source 
of the goods or services of the mark’s owner.”61 Thus, a plaintiff’s mark must 
be famous nationwide among general consumers.62 This means that marks 
 
 55.  See id. at 434. 
 56.  MCCARTHY, supra note 48, § 24:96. 
 57.  Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 1125 (2006)). 
 58.  Delflache et al., supra note 52, at 140–44. 
 59.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 60.  See id. 
 61.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 62.  See id. 
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that are only famous in a niche market or limited geographic territory do not 
qualify for protection.63 Because federal dilution law is an exclusive remedy 
reserved for only the most prominent marks, owners of marks that are merely 
locally famous or famous in a specialized field must rely on state dilution 
law or an infringement claim for protection.64 In determining whether a mark 
has attained fame, the statute permits courts to “consider all relevant factors,” 
including:  
 
(i) The duration, extent, and geographic reach of adver-
tising and publicity of the mark, whether advertised or pub-
licized by the owner or third parties. 
(ii) The amount, volume, and geographic extent of 
sales of goods or services offered under the mark. 
(iii) The extent of actual recognition of the mark. 
(iv) Whether the mark was registered . . . on the prin-
cipal register.65  
 
Dilution fame is a rigorous standard that the Federal Circuit has recog-
nized is “difficult to prove.”66 The scope of fame is intentionally narrow to 
ensure that only “those few truly famous marks like Budweiser beer . . . 
Camel cigarettes . . . and Barbie Dolls” are protected.67 Otherwise, the deli-
cate balance between fair competition and protection of a mark holder’s good 
will would be disrupted by an overly broad cause of action for any reproduc-
tion of a mark.68 In addition, the plaintiff’s mark must have achieved fame 
prior to the date of the defendant’s first use of its mark in commerce.69 Ex-
amples of famous marks include the following: HOT WHEELS for toy 
cars;70 BIG GULP for drinks;71 and the HERSHEY COMPANY trade dress 
 
 63.  Scot A. Duvall, The Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006: Balanced Protection for Famous 
Brands, 97 TRADEMARK REP. 1252, 1261–62 (2007). 
 64.  See Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2005: Hearing on H.R. 683 Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, & Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 11 (2005) [here-
inafter Hearing] (statement of Anne Gundelfinger, President, International Trademark Association). 
 65.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A). 
 66.  Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 67.  Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. Sys. v. KST Elec., Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d 657, 679 (W.D. Tex. 
2008). 
 68.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 48, § 24:104 (“If every trademark could invoke the anti-dilution 
remedy and stop uses of all similar marks in every market and every line of trade, this would upset the 
traditional balance of fair versus free competition that in [sic] inherent in trademark law.”). 
 69.  See Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 172 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 70.  Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 635 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 71.  7-Eleven, Inc. v. Wechsler, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1715, 1728 (T.T.A.B. 2007). 
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for candy bars.72 In contrast, courts have found the following marks not fa-
mous: the MAKER’S MARK red dripping wax seal mark for whiskey;73 the 
magenta color mark for T-MOBILE wireless telecommunications products 
and services;74 and the CRISTAL mark for sparkling wine.75  
B. Distinctiveness Requirement 
A protectable mark must be “distinctive, inherently or through acquired 
distinctiveness.”76 A mark is distinctive if it retains association with the sen-
ior user, even when the famous mark is encountered in a context unrelated 
to the senior user’s goods or services.77 In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Spam Ar-
rest, LLC, the owner of the SPAM mark for canned meat petitioned to cancel 
the registration of the mark SPAM ARREST for computer software designed 
to filter unsolicited emails.78 The Board held that the SPAM mark did not 
possess the requisite degree of distinctiveness for dilution purposes because 
“spam” was a “generic term for unsolicited commercial email.”79 In other 
words, the mark holder failed to demonstrate that the common meaning of 
“spam” was eclipsed by trademark meaning of the term.80 
C. Use as a Mark or Trade Name Requirement 
The TDRA bars a defendant’s “use of a mark or trade name in com-
merce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment 
of the famous mark.”81 Therefore, the defendant must use the mark as a mark 
or trade name.82 According to Professor Burstein, “the junior user must use 
the famous mark—or something similar to it—to indicate the source of his 
or her own goods or services.”83 In Nat'l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford 
Motor Co., the printing business NBFP maintained a website that allowed 
 
 72.  Hershey Co. v. Art Van Furniture, Inc., No. 08-14463, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87509, at *36 
(E.D. Mich. Oct. 24, 2008). 
 73.  Maker’s Mark Distillery, Inc. v. Diageo N. Am., Inc., 703 F. Supp. 2d 671, 699–700 (W.D. Ky. 
2010), aff’d, 679 F.3d 410 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 74.  T-Mobile US, Inc. v. AIO Wireless LLC, 991 F. Supp. 2d 888, 931 (S.D. Tex. 2014). 
 75.  Roederer v. J. Garcia Carrión, S.A., 732 F. Supp. 2d 836, 880 (D. Minn. 2010). 
 76.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1). 
 77.  Hormel Foods Corp. v. Spam Arrest, LLC, Cancellation No. 92042134, 2007 
WL 4287254, at *17 (T.T.A.B. Nov. 21, 2007). 
 78.  Id. at *1. 
 79.  Id. at *18. 
 80.  See id. 
 81.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2012). 
 82.  Sarah L. Burstein, Dilution by Tarnishment: The New Cause of Action, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 
1189, 1221 (2008). 
 83.  Id. 
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customers to select corporate logos, including Ford’s marks, from a catalog 
for custom printed designs.84 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
finding that Ford failed to demonstrate dilution because “NBFP did not ‘use’ 
Ford's marks . . . in identifying or distinguishing its own goods or services 
merely by reproducing them for customers as part of its commercial printing 
business.”85  
D. Dilution by Blurring 
Dilution by blurring involves an “association arising from the similarity 
between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinc-
tiveness of the famous mark.”86 Under dilution theory, a famous mark’s dis-
tinctive quality, and thus selling power, is diminished when it is associated 
with multiple sources.87 Examples of blurring include “Kodak pianos”88 and 
“Harry Potter dry cleaners.”89 For instance, suppose a pet owner has her poo-
dle groomed at “Smirnoff Salon.” Blurring is not concerned with the possi-
bility that the consumer may mistakenly assume that Smirnoff has branched 
its operations into the pet grooming industry. Instead, blurring addresses the 
injury that occurs when the consumer thinks of both the vodka brand and the 
pet salon when confronted with the SMIRNOFF mark.90 Because the mark 
ceases to recall one source, Smirnoff is deprived of direct mental association 
with its brand.91 And if the SMIRNOFF mark thereafter appears on sandpa-
per and bubblegum, then the mark’s source identification ability is further 
dissipated. Hence, dilution by blurring has been compared to “the pollution 
of a lake”;92 “a cancer-like growth”;93 “death by a thousand cuts”;94 and “the 
‘first of a hundred bee stings.’”95 In determining whether such injury has 
occurred, courts may balance the following non-exhaustive factors:  
 
 
 84.  Nat’l Bus. Forms & Printing, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 671 F.3d 526, 530 (5th Cir. 2012). 
 85.  Id. at 536. 
 86.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 87.  See MCCARTHY, supra note 48, § 24:69. 
 88.  Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 1031 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 89.  Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 90.  See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 91.  See id. 
 92.  McDonald’s Corp. v. Gunville, No. 77C1646, 1979 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11106, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 
July 11, 1979). 
 93.  Allied Maint. Corp. v. Allied Mech. Trades, Inc., 369 N.E.2d 1162, 1165 (N.Y. 1977). 
 94.  Barton Beebe, A Defense of the New Federal Trademark Antidilution Law, 16 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1143, 1163 (2006). 
 95.  Id. 
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(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade 
name and the famous mark.  
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness 
of the famous mark. 
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark 
is engaging in substantially exclusive use of the mark. 
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.  
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name in-
tended to create an association with the famous mark.  
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade 
name and the famous mark.96 
 
The Board applied the TDRA blurring factors in Chanel, Inc. v. Makar-
czyk, where it sustained designer brand Chanel’s opposition to registration 
of the CHANEL mark for “real estate development and construction.”97 The 
Board concluded that the applicant’s use of the CHANEL mark was likely 
to cause dilution by blurring because the marks at issue were identical; the 
famous mark was distinctive; Chanel engaged in substantially exclusive use 
of its mark; and the famous mark enjoyed a high degree of recognition.98 
Furthermore, the applicant intended to create an association with Chanel be-
cause he named luxury rental units after fashion brands and boasted an al-
leged business relationship with Chanel.99  
E. Dilution by Tarnishment 
Dilution by tarnishment is defined as “association arising from the sim-
ilarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark that harms the rep-
utation of the famous mark.”100 The gravamen of a dilution by tarnishment 
complaint is that the defendant’s unauthorized use degrades the positive con-
notations attached to the plaintiff’s mark.101 Tarnishment occurs when a 
trademark is “linked to products of shoddy quality, or is portrayed in an un-
wholesome or unsavory context likely to evoke unflattering thoughts about 
 
 96.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
 97.  Chanel, Inc. v. Makarczyk, 110 U.S.P.Q.2d 2013 (BNA), 2014–15 (T.T.A.B. 2014). 
 98.  Id. at 2025–26. 
 99.  See id. at 2026. 
 100.  15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 101.  See Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 
200 CHICAGO-KENT JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY Vol 17:1 
the owner's product.”102 In such cases, the defendant’s use impinges upon the 
famous mark’s advertising ability and business reputation.103  
A mark may be tarnished in two contexts. First, dilution by tarnishment 
has been found in cases involving sex, drugs, and adult content. For instance, 
in Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Cal. Imps., the manufacturer of NEWPORT cig-
arettes brought action against a business that sold NEWPROT “spice,” a 
smoking potpourri product “sprayed with a synthetic chemical similar to 
THC, the active ingredient in marijuana.”104 The court found the defendants 
liable for dilution by tarnishment because NEWPROT was advertised to 
“customers interested in legal highs” and at the same time, synthetic mariju-
ana was a controversial subject in the media.105 In another example, luxury 
car manufacturer Rolls-Royce brought suit against a musician who used the 
stage name ROLLS ROYCE RIZZY.106 In granting the plaintiff injunctive 
relief, the court reasoned that the defendant had engaged in dilution by tar-
nishment under federal and New Jersey law because the musician promoted 
explicit lyrics and sexual themes, including the “Call of Booty” event and a 
hit single entitled “Hoe in You.”107 
Second, dilution by tarnishment has been found in cases where a mark 
is improperly associated with inferior goods or services. According to the 
Second Circuit, “tarnishment is not limited to seamy conduct.”108 In Stein-
way & Sons v. Robert Demars & Friends, for example, the court found that 
the defendant’s “inexpensive, mass-produced” clip-on beverage can handles 
bearing the designation STEIN-WAY diluted the prestigious STEINWAY 
mark associated with high quality pianos.109 And in Burberry Ltd. v. Euro 
Moda, Inc., the court held that high-end fashion brand Burberry proved di-
lution per se because the defendants sold counterfeit Burberry merchandise 
“made from substandard materials.”110  
F. Association Arising from Similarity 
 Dilution by tarnishment and dilution by blurring both require “asso-
ciation arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a 
 
 102.  Deere & Co. v. MTD Prods., Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994). 
 103.  See id. 
 104.  Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Cal. Imps., LLC, 886 F. Supp. 2d 529, 533 n.4 (E.D. Va. 2012). 
 105.  Id. at 537. 
 106.  Rolls-Royce Motors Cars Ltd. v. Davis, 118 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581, 1583 (D.N.J. 2016). 
 107.  See id. at 1589. 
 108.  Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Prods., Inc., 73 F.3d 497, 507 (2d Cir. 1996). 
 109.  Steinway & Sons v. Robert Demars & Friends, 210 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 954, 961 (C.D. Cal. 1981). 
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famous mark.”111 At first blush, infringement confusion and dilution associ-
ation may seem to refer to the same mental concept. Trademark infringe-
ment, however, requires a consumer to mistakenly attribute a junior user’s 
mark to a senior user.112 By contrast, association in the dilution context oc-
curs when a consumer encounters the junior user’s mark, but is reminded of 
the senior user’s famous mark.113 For instance, when a consumer is con-
fronted by an advertisement for CHEERIOS cat litter, she thinks of the brand 
for breakfast cereal, but is not necessarily confused by the overlap.  
Nevertheless, instances of consumer confusion are probative of associ-
ation, and thus dilution.114 In Bath & Body Works Brand Mgmt., Inc. v. Sum-
mit Entm’t, LLC, for example, the court determined that a potential finding 
of association between Bath & Body Works and Summit Entertainment was 
supported by evidence of consumer confusion between the former’s Twilight 
Woods and Twilight Crush marks for personal care products, and the latter’s 
motion picture Twilight franchise.115 Likewise, the Second Circuit in Star-
bucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc. noted in dicta that survey evi-
dence of source confusion may demonstrate association because the senior 
user’s mark would necessarily enter one’s mind.116  
In addition, “not just any mental association will suffice—it must be an 
association that arises from the similarity or identity of the two marks.”117 
Although the TDRA is silent regarding the degree of similarity, case law 
indicates that it need not be substantial similarity. In Starbucks Corp., the 
Second Circuit held that the district court had erred by requiring substantial 
similarity between the marks CHARBUCKS and STARBUCKS for a show-
ing of dilution by blurring.118 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Second Cir-
cuit in Levi Strauss & Co. v. Abercrombie & Fitch Trading Co., where the 
court found that the plain language of the TDRA indicated that jeans retailer 
Levi Strauss need not demonstrate that its “Arcuate” back pocket stitching 
design was “identical, nearly identical or substantially similar” to Abercrom-
bie’s “Ruehl” design.119 
 
 111.  15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(2)(B)–(C). 
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 113.  Id. § 24:116. 
 114.  See id (“[I]f a survey reveals evidence of a likelihood of confusion between conflicting marks, 
then this is also evidence that there is the kind of ‘association’ that is one ingredient of dilution.”). 
 115.  Bath & Body Works Brand Mgmt., Inc. v. Summit Entm’t, LLC, 7 F. Supp. 3d 385, 400–401 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
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IV. DILUTION IN THE AUGMENTED REALITY CONTEXT 
A. Advertising Overlays 
In the future, consumers will insert contact lenses or don other eyewear 
to experience augmented and virtual reality. Samsung has already filed a pa-
tent in South Korea for smart contact lenses intended for augmented real-
ity.120 The lenses incorporate a camera and sensors that are controlled by 
blinking.121 Businesses will likely utilize augmented reality technology to 
overlay digital advertisements onto the physical world.122 When such tech-
nology becomes ubiquitous, a shopper perusing the stores of a shopping mall 
may receive a pop up in her field of view alerting her to the location of a 
nearby pair of shoes based on her prior online searches for a similar style, 
color, size, and price point. Similarly, viewing a certain object may generate 
an algorithm that suggests related goods and services.123 Thus, if the said 
shoe shopper picks up and closely examines three pairs of black ballet flats 
within an hour, she may receive analogous suggestions. Or a consumer eying 
a loaf of gluten-free bread at the grocery store may notice ads in his periphery 
pitching gluten-free cookies. And if he places the bread in his shopping cart, 
he may be notified that the same bread is sold for a dollar less at a nearby 
store.  
Furthermore, augmented reality may eventually become a completely 
custom experience. Apps with presets dialed to user preferences would en-
hance informational intake by removing or diminishing the negative and am-
plifying the positive. For instance, if a user was committed to losing weight, 
temptations at the grocery store would be blacked out or covered by adver-
tisements for healthier alternatives. Thus, a bag of potato chips becomes a 
nondescript black blob or an endorsement for dried banana crisps. Likewise, 
picking up a bag of baby carrots would prompt positive reinforcement by 
triggering rewarding stimuli, such the playing of a cheerful tune. 
Depending on how advanced – and invasive – augmented reality tech-
nology gets, implanted microchips could monitor other bodily signals, such 
as heart rate, facial expressions, and tone of voice, that would further per-
sonalize advertising suggestions. For instance, detection of the faintest trace 
 
 120.  Amit Chowdhry, Samsung Patent Unveils Idea for Smart Contact Lenses with a Camera and 
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of a smile 20% of the time a consumer observes a cat in an advertisement 
translates into individualized advertisements that make liberal use of felines. 
And if the likelihood of a smile increases when the cat is chubby, the con-
sumer can count on digital overlays of chubby cats purring next to real world 
candles, chubby cats rubbing up against Egyptian Cotton sheets, and chubby 
cats playfully pawing at laundry dryer balls. Or perhaps such smart technol-
ogy will apply data relating to a user’s mood when she interacts with prod-
ucts by certain brands. A shopper scanning the oral care aisle at a drugstore 
may receive a virtual advertisement pointing out that she usually seems tired 
when she uses her manual toothbrush, so perhaps a new electric model in a 
jazzy color will increase her alertness when brushing her teeth.  
B. Overlays and Dilution 
As augmented reality content becomes more prevalent, the technology 
promises to raise various trademark implications. A company could super-
impose its digital trademark on top of a competitor’s physical logo or inter-
rupt a user’s observation of a competitor’s physical advertisement with a pop 
up virtual advertisement.124 In addition to trademark infringement, the layer-
ing of graphics and logos onto the physical world may present opportunities 
for trademark dilution.  
Digital dilution of trademarks has been found in the context of internet 
domain names. For example, in Archdiocese of St. Louis v. Internet Entm't 
Grp., Inc., the owners of marks memorializing the Pope’s 1999 visit to St. 
Louis sued Internet Entertainment Group, Inc. for using the marks as internet 
domain names for websites that advertised sexually explicit material.125 The 
court held that the defendant diluted the PAPAL 1999 mark and its variations 
by “associating them with adult entertainment venues that are inconsistent 
with the positive and spiritual uplifting image plaintiffs have striven to create 
and maintain . . . .”126 And in Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc., the court held that Victoria’s Cyber Secret violated the 
FTDA by using the VICTORIA’S SECRET mark for adult entertainment 
websites.127 In the court’s opinion, the defendant was liable for dilution by 
tarnishment because the marks were used in association with “entertainment 
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of a lascivious nature.”128 Furthermore, the plaintiff’s use also constituted 
dilution by blurring because consumers would cease to relate the mark to 
only the lingerie retailer.129  
C. Use as a Mark or Trade Name 
In addition, keyword advertising cases offer analogous fact patterns be-
cause a physical trademark could trigger a virtual advertisement similar to 
how a keyword prompts sponsored link advertisements.130 In Tiffany (NJ) 
Inc. v. eBay, Inc., online auction company eBay purchased sponsored links 
that advertised its provision of merchandise from luxury jewelry retailer Tif-
fany whenever search terms like “Tiffany” were entered onto search en-
gines.131 According to Tiffany, eBay engaged in dilution by blurring because 
it used the TIFFANY marks to promote counterfeit products, thus impairing 
the ability of the marks to identify the actual Tiffany brand and its authentic 
jewelry.132 Tiffany also argued that eBay was liable for dilution by tarnish-
ment because its use of the TIFFANY marks created a negative association 
between Tiffany and low-quality products.133 The Second Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s rejection of Tiffany’s dilution claim however, agreeing 
that eBay did not use the TIFFANY marks to identify its own products. 134 
Rather, eBay only used the marks to directly advertise the Tiffany brand.135 
Because eBay merely used the TIFFANY marks to identify Tiffany jewelry 
available on eBay, rather than to identify eBay’s own products or services, 
the Second Circuit seems to indicate that eBay’s use of the marks qualified 
as permissible non-trademark use.136 
And in Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., language learning software 
developer Rosetta Stone filed suit against Google, asserting various causes 
of action, including trademark dilution.137 Google’s AdWords program al-
lowed competitors to use Rosetta Stone’s trademarks as keywords that trig-
gered sponsored-link advertisements.138 The district court found that Rosetta 
 
 128.  Id. at 1355. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Cf. WASSOM, supra note 122, at 121. 
 131.  See Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay Inc., 600 F.3d 93, 101 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 132.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 133.  Id. 
 134.  Tiffany (NJ) Inc., 600 F.3d at 112. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  See id. 
 137.  Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 152 (4th Cir. 2012). 
 138.  Id. at 150–52. 
 
2017 DILUTED REALITY 205 
Stone failed to establish dilution because Google’s trademark policy in-
creased Rosetta Stone’s brand awareness and Rosetta Stone did not prove 
that Google used the ROSETTA STONE marks to identify its own goods 
and services.139 The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded the dilution claim, 
however, holding that the district court misapplied the fair use defense when 
it required the plaintiff, Rosetta Stone, to demonstrate that the defendant, 
Google, was using the ROSETTA STONE marks to identify Google.140 In 
addition, the appellate court challenged the lower court’s reliance on merely 
one of the six non-exhaustive factors of dilution by blurring, the degree of 
recognition of the famous mark.141  
But the district court and the Fourth Circuit in Rosetta Stone Ltd. erred 
in relying on the nominative fair use defense instead of the statutory require-
ment that the defendant use the famous mark as a “mark or trade name.”142 
Like in Tiffany (NJ) Inc., the dilution claim should have failed because 
Google did not use the marks for source identification purposes.143 Perhaps 
confusion is attributable to the overlap between the trademark use require-
ment and the nominative fair use defense.144 After all, requiring the plaintiff 
to prove that the defendant is using the famous mark as a “mark or trade 
name” is essentially the same as requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate an 
absence of nominative use. Thus, the nominative fair use defense seems 
needlessly duplicative.  
In Tiffany (NJ) Inc., eBay did not use the TIFFANY mark to identify 
eBay, but rather to identify Tiffany products available on eBay.145 And in 
Rosetta Stone Ltd., Google did not use the ROSETTA STONE marks to iden-
tify Google, but rather to identify third party competitors.146 Similar scenar-
ios may arise in the augmented reality context. An online marketplace app 
could use physical trademarks as markers to trigger virtual suggestions tout-
ing the availability of similar products on its website. Likewise, augmented 
reality browsers could utilize virtual advertising programs that recognize 
physical trademarks like keywords. But since both uses are nominative, there 
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would be no dilution claim. However, if a business uses physical trademarks 
to directly advertise its own goods or services, the outcome might be differ-
ent. Suppose a green company develops an app that provides advertisements 
for its own earth friendly alternatives whenever the user picks up a product 
bearing the logo of an environmentally harmful company. In such a situation, 
the green company is using the mark of the environmentally harmful com-
pany to identify its own goods or services, and thus satisfies the TDRA re-
quirement that the defendant used a mark as a “mark or trade name.”147  
D. Use in Commerce 
As a threshold matter, dilution requires that the junior user use the sen-
ior user’s mark “in commerce.”148 Augmented reality browsers may employ 
programs that resemble Google’s AdWords and Keyword Suggestion Tool. 
Google’s Keyword Suggestion Tool recommends keywords to advertisers 
and AdWords allows advertisers to purchase keywords that trigger spon-
sored link advertisements.149 But instead of inputting search requests into a 
search engine, digital advertisements would be generated whenever users 
look at certain physical objects or trademarks.150 If an entity like Google sug-
gests and sells trademarks to advertisers to use to prompt digital advertise-
ments, the use in commerce requirement will likely be satisfied, as demon-
strated by Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc. below.  
In Rescuecom Corp., the Second Circuit held that Google’s sale of the 
Rescuecom marks to advertising customers constituted “use in com-
merce.”151 The court revisited its prior decision, 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. 
WhenU.Com, Inc., to highlight notable differences between the facts under-
lying the two cases.152 In 1-800 Contacts, the defendant WhenU provided 
free proprietary software to users as part of a bundle downloaded from the 
internet.153 Based on search terms or websites visited, the software generated 
relevant pop-up advertisements that were randomly selected from directory 
categories.154 1-800 alleged trademark infringement because the software 
suggested competitor advertisements whenever users accessed 1-800’s web-
site.155 The Second Circuit found that the internet marketing company was 
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not liable for infringement because it did not use the 1-800 CONTACTS 
mark.156 Furthermore, the internet marketing company’s program did not al-
low clients to purchase specific keywords. 157 
Rescuecom Corp. explained that 1-800 Contacts was distinguishable in 
several important respects.158 First, in 1-800 Contacts, WhenU did not use or 
reproduce the 1-800 CONTACTS mark; instead, it used 1-800 Contacts’ 
website address.159 In Rescuecom Corp. however, Google sold the 
RESCUECOM mark to prompt sponsored link advertisements.160 And sec-
ond, WhenU did not sell trademarks to use as keywords to advertising cus-
tomers, nor did it “otherwise manipulate which category-related advertise-
ment will pop up in response to any particular terms on the internal 
directory.”161 In other words, the proprietary software relied on a category 
associated with the search term or website, rather than the actual search term 
or website itself; whereas, Google allowed advertisers to purchase the 
RESCUECOM mark and use the mark to trigger specific sponsored adver-
tisements.162 Furthermore, Google used its Keyword Suggestion Tool to rec-
ommend that advertisers purchase the Rescuecom trademark.163  
E. Likelihood of Dilution: Association Arising from Similarity 
But even if trademark use and use in commerce are satisfied, the ques-
tion remains whether there is a likelihood of dilution. As mentioned earlier, 
dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment both require “association 
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark.” 164 Dilution by blurring traditionally occurs when a company with an 
unrelated product adopts a famous mark as its own.165 When a company 
starts selling Rogaine rugs, the value of the ROGAINE mark is diluted be-
cause it no longer uniquely identifies the hair product. The new association 
with floor decoration diminishes the formerly singular association with the 
hair product. In the augmented reality context however, if Company A’s 
physical advertisement featuring the SCHWIFTY SPAGHETTI mark 
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triggers a virtual overlay advertisement for Company B’s RICK RAVIOLI, 
it is questionable whether there is association arising from the similarity be-
tween the SCHWIFTY mark that Company B uses and the famous 
SCHWIFTY mark. Admittedly, both marks are identical. But the consumer 
does not necessarily associate SCHWIFTY with Company B because each 
product bears its own distinct mark. Moreover, the mental connection is at-
tenuated because the consumer is not actively searching for the term 
SCHWIFTY; rather, she is merely passively observing her surroundings and 
receiving a pop-up advertisement for RICK RAVIOLI. 
V. DEFENSES TO AUGMENTED REALITY DILUTION 
Tension exists between the First Amendment and dilution because the 
Constitution guarantees free speech, but trademark law allows regulation of 
the use of famous marks.166 In E.S.S. Entm’t 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, 
Inc., the owner of the Play Pen Gentlemen’s Club alleged that the manufac-
turer of the Grand Theft Auto: San Andreas video game infringed its trade 
mark and trade dress with its digital depiction of the Pig Pen strip club.167 
Although the Ninth Circuit observed that the real-life strip club possessed 
“little cultural significance,” the court held that Rock Star’s portrayal of the 
club served the expressive purpose of representing a “cartoon-style parody 
of East Lost Angeles.”168 Furthermore, the court reasoned that the “reasona-
ble consumer” would not mistakenly assume that the Pig Pen was sponsored 
by the owners of the Play Pen.169 
And in Sherwood 48 Assoc. v. Sony Corp. of Am., Sony used digital 
pictures of Times Squares to create an altered version of the location for its 
2002 film Spider-Man.170 The owners of the Times Square buildings sued 
Sony for various claims, including trademark infringement, trade dress in-
fringement, and trespass, because Sony digitally replaced billboard adver-
tisements that had appeared on the buildings when the pictures were taken.171 
With respect to trademark and trade dress infringement, the court concluded 
that the digital alteration of the advertisements was protected under the First 
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Amendment because it served artistic purposes.172 The Second Circuit, how-
ever, found that the First Amendment was not an absolute bar to trade dress 
claims at the pleading stage.173 
The TDRA balances free speech concerns with protection of the good 
will associated with famous marks.174 Even where the plaintiff has estab-
lished a prima facie case for dilution, the defendant may still not be liable for 
dilution. The TDRA excludes the following from its reach: 
 
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive 
fair use, or facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by 
another person other than as a designation of source for the 
person’s own goods or services, including use in connection 
with—  
(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers 
to compare goods or services; or  
(ii) identifying and parodying, criticizing, or com-
menting upon the famous mark owner or the goods or 
services of the famous mark owner.  
(B) All forms of news reporting and news commentary.  
(C) Any noncommercial use of a mark.175 
 
The nominative fair use defense applies “where a defendant uses the 
mark to refer to the trademarked good itself.”176 And descriptive fair use, or 
classic fair use, is invoked where a mark is used to describe a product “in a 
non-trademark sense.”177 The statute also expressly includes defenses for 
comparative advertising, parody, news reporting and commentary, and non-
commercial use.178  
A. Comparative Advertising 
According to Smith v. Chanel, the use of a competitor’s mark in com-
parative advertising is permissible, absent misrepresentation or a likelihood 
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of confusion.179 If a user’s observation of Company ABC’s mark prompts an 
advertisement for Company XYZ that appears in her periphery, the user can 
compare the claims of both advertisements. Thus, the user would not be as-
sociating the goods or services of Company ABC with Company XYZ, but 
rather would compare the assertions of the respective businesses. But if the 
advertisement for Company XYZ completely covers Company ABC’s mark, 
the viability of such a defense may diminish, especially if the overlay is 
opaque.  
B. Parody and Social Commentary 
Aside from overlays advertising competing goods or services, overlays 
could also alter marks for artistic, social, political, economic, or environmen-
tal purposes. If augmented reality becomes a platform for user content simi-
lar to YouTube, the potential for individuals and organizations to use physi-
cal trademarks as markers for digital messages is immense.180 Anytime a 
company is involved in a controversy, manipulation of the brand’s logo 
would provide a constant reminder of the underlying scandal. For example, 
the iPhone app “The Leak in Your Hometown” allows users to see the BP 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill.181 The user hovers her phone camera over the 
BP logo at a gas station and an overlay of a broken pipe spewing oil ap-
pears.182 The project promotes the “repurposing of corporate icons” as a 
means of artistic expression.183 Although the app seems to implicate dilution 
by tarnishment because it has an adverse effect on BP’s reputation, the app 
is not for sale so there is no “use of a mark or trade name in commerce” and 
the virtual alteration of the mark may qualify as a protected parody.184  
 In a resonant case decided under Missouri’s anti-dilution statute, beer 
distributor Anheuser-Busch sued publishing business Balducci Publications 
for dilution by tarnishment, among other claims, because the publisher 
printed a mock advertisement for “Michelob Oily” in its humor magazine.185 
The fictional advertisement states, “ONE TASTE AND YOU’LL DRINK 
IT OILY” and features an image of a can of Michelob Dry pouring oil over 
a fish.186 In addition, Anheuser-Busch’s “A & Eagle” design is depicted 
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soaked in oil below the Shell Oil Company symbol.187 The false advertise-
ment was intended to refer to the “then-recent Shell oil spill in the Gasconade 
River—a source of Anheuser-Busch's water supply.”188 In an opinion lacking 
any sense of humor, the Eighth Circuit rejected the defendant’s argument 
that the parody was protected under the First Amendment because the ad 
criticized the quality of the mark holder’s product.189 Moreover, the court 
held that the use constituted dilution by tarnishment because the ad was lo-
cated on the back cover of the humor magazine; thus, the casual observer 
might fail to appreciate its parodic nature.190 
More recently, in Louis Vuitton Malletier, S.A. v. My Other Bag, Inc., 
My Other Bag sold canvas tote bags with graphics resembling expensive 
Louis Vuitton handbags on one side and the “My Other Bag” slogan on the 
other side.191 The District Court suggested that Louis Vuitton “just cannot 
take a joke,” and held that MOB’s use of the Louis Vuitton marks was a 
protected parody.192 The Second Circuit agreed, explaining that MOB in-
tended to poke fun at Louis Vuitton’s luxury image because “MOB’s plebian 
product” clearly indicated that MOB was not affiliated with Louis Vuitton.193 
Although the tote bags evoked LV handbags, the juxtaposition of the de-
signer images with MOB’s casual product conveyed the contradiction that 
parody requires.194 Indeed, the crux of the joke was that the inexpensive bags 
were designated as “My Other Bag.”195  
Suppose an organization combating obesity creates an app that criti-
cizes fast food by altering restaurant logos. Thus, every time a consumer 
looks at a “McDonald’s” sign, a digital overlay would instead spell out 
“McWrongald’s” in a similar font and include information critiquing calorie 
content. Likewise, “Wendy’s Old Fashioned Hamburgers” would change 
into “Weighty’s Old Fashioned Diabetes.” But even assuming that the app is 
sold and satisfies the use in commerce requirement, there would be a persua-
sive parody defense since the app’s alteration of the marks “convey[s] two 
simultaneous—and contradictory—messages: that it is the original, but also 
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that it is not the original and is instead a parody.”196 Furthermore, the app 
would not be promoting a competing product, and according to Deere & Co. 
v. MTD Prod., Inc., “more leeway for alterations is appropriate in the context 
of satiric expression and humorous ads for noncompeting products.”197  
C. Noncommercial Use 
Finally, even if an augmented reality app is sold, the use may still fall 
under the noncommercial exception if the primary purpose of the app is so-
cial commentary.198 The mere presence of economic incentive does not pre-
clude a noncommercial defense.199 For instance, in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Rec-
ords, Mattel brought action against MCA and other music companies that 
produced and sold a song entitled “Barbie Girl” by the Danish band Aqua.200 
The Ninth Circuit observed that MCA engaged in dilution by blurring, but 
ultimately found that the defendant’s use was exempted under the noncom-
mercial exception to the FTDA.201 Although the court found that the 
BARBIE mark served a commercial purpose because it was used to sell cop-
ies of the song, the use was not “purely commercial speech” under the First 
Amendment.202 Indeed, the song also performed an expressive function be-
cause it ridiculed the Barbie image.203  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Interruptive digital advertisements may impair the advertising ability of 
physical trademarks and parodic apps may tarnish brand reputations. Never-
theless, keyword advertising cases and TDRA defenses indicate that the vi-
ability of a dilution claim in the context of augmented reality overlays may 
be narrow. Should the TDRA expressly address dilution by augmented real-
ity? On one hand, the selling power of physical trademarks may be dimin-
ished by digital pop-up overlays, especially if the public grows accustomed 
to physical-digital pairings. Arguably, if a physical advertisement for 
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Company ABC almost always triggers a digital advertisement for Company 
XYZ, consumers may come to associate ABC with XYZ, and this diminishes 
the unique hold that ABC has on consumers. In addition, an augmented re-
ality advertisement is more engaging and interactive than a physical adver-
tisement; thus, its effect on consumers is more substantial. If a consumer 
views the physical advertisement for Fluffy Furniture, but then is prompted 
to experience an augmented reality advertisement for Cushy Couches that 
allows the user to visualize digital furniture in her home, the impact of Fluffy 
pales in comparison to Cushy.204 Furthermore, augmented reality advertising 
is comparatively less expensive than print and broadcast advertising.205 So 
perhaps mark holders with physical advertisements should receive greater 
protection for the additional investment. 
But at the same time, the scope of a dilution claim is intentionally lim-
ited. Dilution law is not intended to extend “rights in gross” to trademark 
owners that are the “equivalent of granting real property interests.”206 Fur-
thermore, lawmakers would risk running afoul of the First Amendment by 
expanding the TDRA to include broader protection for dilution by aug-
mented reality. And companies can foreseeably seek relief through alterna-
tive avenues. As with any form of technological advancement, content crea-
tors will benefit from embracing innovation to stay ahead. For example, 
office furniture designer Herman Miller introduced virtual versions of its 
“Aeron” chairs to combat knockoff products in the online virtual world Sec-
ond Life.207 Herman Miller even offered to exchange knockoff items for au-
thentic Herman Miller chairs at no cost.208 Either way, courts should be care-
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